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We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile
interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms
to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive
pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch
sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attacker’s
and/or defender’s access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange
in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDER’s
mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use
heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide unique insight into the value of secrecy and deception to either
side. We demonstrate with two hypothetical North Korean scenarios.
Subject classifications : missile defense; optimization; bilevel integer linear program; mixed-integer linear program.
Area of review : OR Practice.
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They may vex us with shot, or with assault. To intercept this
inconvenience, a piece of ordnance ‘gainst it I have placed.
Shakespeare, Henry IV
1. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense:
Background
This paper introduces JOINT DEFENDER, a new, bilevel
(i.e., two-sided) optimization model to help plan the pre-
positioning of the defensive interceptor platforms that the
United States and its allies are deploying to counter exigent
theater ballistic missile threats. Solutions require only a few
seconds or minutes on a personal computer and can yield
important new insights.
1.1. The Theater Ballistic Missile Threat
Theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) can deliver high-
explosive, chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads over
long distances. Although no potential adversary other than
Russia possesses TBMs capable of striking the United
States, both China and North Korea are developing missiles
that will likely have that capability by 2015 (CIA 2001).
Existing short-range and medium-range TBMs pose imme-
diate threats in many regional conflicts, however, as demon-
strated in the first and second Gulf wars. Figure 1 illustrates
some TBMs that currently concern military planners.
North Korea is particularly worrisome. It is known to
be developing and exporting ballistic missiles and mis-
sile technology, and has numerous indigenous missile-
production facilities and prepared launch sites. Figure 2
depicts some of those launch sites and the areas they
threaten.
North Korea is developing longer-range intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (e.g., the Taep’o-Dong II) that will be
capable of striking the western coast of the United States
and Alaska (CIA 2001). Given that North Korea also claims
to have developed fission weapons, it is vital that we under-
stand how to best deploy (i.e., pre-position) interceptor plat-
forms to defend against TBM attacks from that country.
In response to such threats, this paper develops JOINT
DEFENDER, a bilevel integer linear program for pre-
positioning theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) assets,
and demonstrates how to analyze scenarios using two
hypothetical Korean examples. Before developing this new
model, we first describe the interceptor platforms that have
been fielded or are under development, and review the ana-
lytical tools currently used to plan deployment of these
platforms.
1.2. TBM Interceptor Platforms
Figure 3 shows three components of the United States joint
missile defense, which we will use as representative defen-
sive platforms.
The Army’s PATRIOT anti-missile missile system is
currently deployed and has been used in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. PATRIOT provides terminal defense against bal-
listic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. It consists of
745
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Figure 1. Current ballistic missile threats. Shown left to right are a North Korean Scud-B transporter-erector-launcher
(TEL), a TEL firing a missile, and an Iranian fixed ballistic missile launcher.
a mobile launcher, a phased-array air search-and-tracking
radar, plus various command and support vehicles. It can
shoot three types of interceptor missiles, the PAC-2, PAC-2
GEM, and PAC-3 (Jane’s 2003c).
The Army is developing theater high altitude air defense
(THAAD), which will provide a midcourse, high-altitude
defense against ballistic missiles using a kinetic-kill inter-
ceptor. THAAD’s physical composition resembles that of
PATRIOT (Jane’s 2003c).
“Navy AEGIS” refers to deployed Ticonderoga-class
guided-missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class guided-
missile destroyers. Each of these ships carries the AEGIS
SPY-1 phased-array radar and can function as a TBM
interceptor platform. These ships currently carry Standard
Missile-2 (SM2) variants that provide terminal defense
against cruise missiles and aircraft. The Navy is now devel-
oping the Standard Missile-3 (SM3), a kinetic-kill exoatmo-
Figure 2. Approximate maximum ranges of North
Korean Scud-B, Scud-C, and No-Dong the-
ater ballistic missiles. Note that all of Japan





spheric interceptor, to provide a midcourse defense against
TBMs (Jane’s 2003b).
TBMD has become an important component of the
Department of Defense research and development bud-
get (Department of Defense 2004), and we may expect
the United States to field a number of new TBMD sys-
tems in the next few years. Indeed, an air-based laser
is already under development (Jane’s 2003e). We do not
include this future system in our demonstration scenarios,
but incorporating such innovations in JOINT DEFENDER
is straightforward.
1.3. Current TBMD Planning Tools
Effective pre-positioning of TBMD assets is crucial given
that (a) a defensive interceptor has limited range, (b) it
can destroy a TBM only at certain points in the TBM’s
trajectory, and (c) that trajectory will depend on the type of
TBM and its launch and target coordinates. Currently, joint
forces commanders can plan pre-positioning using several
analytical tools; we describe these next and point out their
strengths and weaknesses.
Area Air Defense Commander System. The Navy’s
area air defense commander system (AADCS), AN/UYQ-
89, is currently deployed on command ships USS BLUE-
RIDGE, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, the AEGIS cruiser
USS SHILOH, and at the Joint National Integration Cen-
ter in Colorado (Jane’s 2003a). In addition to modules for
real-time tracking of assets and threats, AADCS contains
a planning module that enables air-defense commanders to
plan and “war-game” potential TBMD scenarios.
AADCS uses 32-processor Silicon Graphics supercom-
puters to evaluate, using an enumeration-based myopic
heuristic, a sequence of increasingly complex “defense
plans” before committing to a good one (Silicon Graphics
Incorporated 2003). For each target in a scenario, in prior-
ity order, AADCS enumerates every possible combination
of (a) enemy launch site, (b) missile type, (c) interceptor-
platform position on a fine geographical grid, and (d) inter-
cept salvo (set of interceptors that might be shot at the
TBM). For each of those combinations, it evaluates the
probability of intercepting the TBM successfully. Once
AADCS identifies the required platform(s), position(s),
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Figure 3. TBMD platforms, deployable or under development. Shown left to right are a THAAD launch vehicle, an
AEGIS guided missile cruiser firing a standard missile, and a PATRIOT launch vehicle.
and corresponding salvo(s) that yield a sufficiently high
probability of intercept, the next target in the priority list is
analyzed, more platforms are positioned, and so on. (Once a
platform’s position is fixed, it is also considered for defend-
ing subsequent, lower-priority targets.) AADCS provides
an estimate of defense coverage and an expected number
of enemy missiles that will leak through the defense plan.
AADCS’s brute-force enumeration determines an optimal
defense for its highest-priority target, and that enumeration
goes on to optimize a sequence of restricted problems. Sev-
eral weaknesses are apparent: the procedure is essentially
a sequential greedy heuristic with no guarantee of global
optimality, it ignores the enemy’s strategy, and it requires
an expensive computational platform.
Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS).
The U.S. Air Force’s air operations centers use theater battle
management core systems (TBMCS) for theater-level plan-
ning in support of the area air defense commander. TBMCS
supports strategic planning, air battle planning, and mis-
sion preparation, together with mission execution, reporting,
and analysis; the last items are supported in near real-time
as situations unfold. A module in TBMCS automates an
overlay of potential “launch fans” by defensive “intercep-
tor envelopes.” That is, the module evaluates a manually-
prepared, pre-positioning plan for defenses by analyzing the
intersection of (a) the two-dimensional projection on the
earth’s surface of the three-dimensional region that might be
traversed by a TBM, and (b) a similar projection for the “kill
zone” of an interceptor shot from a given position. This pro-
cedure suggests a plausible solution that indicates whether
or not a hypothesized attacking missile can be struck by
a pre-positioned interceptor, subject to the error induced
by two-dimensional projections. TBMCS cannot optimize
defense plans because it requires human intervention (i.e.,
guessing), it does not measure expected damage incurred by
an attack, and it ignores the enemy’s strategy.
Commander’s Analysis and Planning Simulation.
Since 1993, the Missile Defense Agency has sponsored
commander’s analysis and planning simulation (CAPS),
which is currently hosted by theater ballistic missile-
planning cells of Central Command, European Command,
Pacific Command, Strategic Command, the Naval Postgrad-
uate School, and others—a total of more than 50 sites.
CAPS helps assess defense-system capabilities and posi-
tioning. The performance of manually-prepared defense
plans can be evaluated against manually-prepared threat
scenarios (Sparta 2004). The CAPS operator selects
the “best-looking” defense plan that appears to protect
defended assets (targets) with high probability and appears
to maximize the number of missiles the defender can
engage. CAPS does not make the two-dimensional approxi-
mations that TBMCS does, but it still requires human inter-
vention and ignores the enemy’s strategy.
All three fielded systems, AADCS, TBMCS, and CAPS,
address the complex problem of TBM defense in very dif-
ferent ways, with wide variation in computational require-
ments, degrees of fidelity, and objectives. These systems
can be used to search for “good” defense plans, but only
through manual or automated heuristics. None of the sys-
tems account for how the enemy might change his strategy
in response to observing pre-positioned TBMD assets, i.e.,
in response to observing an implemented defense plan.
2. A New Two-Sided Optimization for
TBMD Planning
We introduce a new paradigm for planning the pre-
positioning of TBMD assets. We first express enemy
courses of action as an “inner” mathematical optimization
that maximizes expected damage subject to known defen-
sive positions and capabilities. An “outer” optimization
minimizes that maximum by pre-positioning defensive plat-
forms and committing to intercept strategies appropriately.
We can most conveniently express our model for TBMD
as a bilevel integer linear program (BLILP) (e.g., Moore
and Bard 1990). Then, because of its special structure, we
can convert our BLILP into a standard mixed-integer lin-
ear program (MILP) to actually solve it. With the roles
of attacker and defender reversed, this general idea has
been successfully used to model a number of network-
interdiction problems (Phillips 1993, Wood 1993, Israeli
and Wood 2002; see Whiteman 2000 for details on an
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application; see Fulkerson and Harding 1977, Golden 1978
for earlier, bilevel linear-programming models involving
continuous interdiction effort; and see Salmeron et al. 2004
for an application of a bilevel optimization to interdicting
electric power grids). In these network-interdiction prob-
lems, an interdictor uses limited offensive resources to
attack and damage an adversary’s network (e.g., road sys-
tem, communications network) to minimize the maximum
benefit his adversary can obtain from it. Skroch (2004)
and Brown et al. (2004) model the optimal disruption of
a weapons development program by interdicting a project
network. Their BLILP cannot be converted to a MILP, and
is solved with a decomposition algorithm.
2.1. TBMD Terminology and Assumptions
The following terminology and assumptions characterize
JOINT DEFENDER.
Both sides have full knowledge of the parameters and
data described below.
Each launch site for attacking missiles is located by lat-
itude and longitude. Any finite number of dispersed launch
sites may exist.
Each target vulnerable to enemy attack is located by lat-
itude and longitude. Any finite number of dispersed targets
may exist, and each has a target value.
Each candidate defender position is located by latitude
and longitude. Any finite number of candidate positions
may exist. The set of positions can include, for example,
a discretized field of grid points with desired geographic
fidelity.
Each enemy missile has a minimum and maximum
range, and can hit any target within this range of its launch
site with a known probability of kill. This probability can
depend on the missile type, target, and range from launch
site to target.
An enemy attack consists of a launch of a missile from
an enemy launch site against a vulnerable target. The
enemy’s goal is to launch a set of attacks that maximizes
total expected target damage.
Each defender class consists of a given number of
individual platforms, each endowed with a loadout of a
given number of each type of interceptor weapon (anti-
missile missiles are the only extant interceptors, but other
types, like the air-based laser, are under development).
Each defending platform may be located at any candidate
defender position that is secure and compatible for its class.
That is, ships may only be positioned at sea, land units on
compatible terrain, and air defenders in safe airspace.
A single attack (one missile from one launch site to one
target) may be engaged by any defending platform with
an intercept salvo of any number of any types of intercep-
tor missiles available on that platform. For planning pur-
poses, and as a matter of effective tactical doctrine, we
assume that the planned intercept of each enemy missile
will be executed by a single defending platform. (In exe-
cution, this would not preclude defending platforms from
providing a layered defense to defended targets, but we do
not address this complication.)
The probability of negation defines the probability that
an intercept salvo will destroy the attacking missile; this
varies by attack launch site, missile type, target location,
defender position, defending salvo, and any synergy among
the intercepting missiles in that salvo. The geometry of
such an engagement can be depicted by an oblate spherical
triangle, with apexes at the launch site, the target loca-
tion, and the defender’s position. The probability of nega-
tion for an intercept salvo is then a function of (a) the
relative positions of missile and interceptor, (b) the vul-
nerability of the attacking missile to the interceptor at the
point of intercept—some interceptors can only strike a mis-
sile traversing its early- or middle-phase flyout trajectory,
and some provide only terminal-phase defense—and (c) the
combined effectiveness of the entire intercept salvo. In
practice, JOINT DEFENDER uses probabilities of nega-
tion computed through a mathematical approximation, or
through lookup and interpolation of engineering estimates
in “cross-range” and “down-range” tables for each type
of intercept salvo and missile altitude. The probability of
negation for an interceptor salvo does not rely on an inde-
pendence assumption among missiles in that salvo.
2.2. Mathematical Development of JOINT
DEFENDER
The attacker controls a set of launch sites s ∈ S, and pos-
sesses fixedms missiles of type m ∈ M pre-positioned at
site s, as well as a pool of mobilem missiles that can be
transported to any capable receiving launch site. Transport
of the mobile missiles may be restricted by movems and/or
movems . Launch site s can launch no more than fixedms+
movems missiles of type m. (Of course, if the defender
knows that launch site s is incapable of launching missile
type m, fixedms =movems = 0.) The defender guards a set
of targets t ∈ T , with each target t having value valt . An
attack a ∈A consists of a launch from site sa ∈ S of a mis-
sile of type ma ∈M at a target ta ∈ T . This attack will hit
and destroy the target with probability of kill Pka, assuming
that the defender takes no action. An upper bound missilest
may be placed on the number of missiles the attacker will
launch at target t. The attacker must decide which missiles
to launch at which targets to maximize total expected target
damage, weighted by target value.
The defender controls a set of defending platforms p ∈ P ,
each of which is a member of platform class cp ∈ C.
Each platform of class c can be pre-positioned at any one
location g ∈ Gc ⊆ G. Each platform p carries loadoutp i
defensive interceptors of type i ∈ I . An attack a can be
engaged with alternative defensive actions d ∈ D, where
defense d launches salvoa cd i interceptors of type(s) i and
succeeds in thwarting the attack with probability of nega-
tion Pna c gd. Each defensive engagement is conditional,
meaning that if attack a is not launched, then no interceptor
devoted to engaging that attack is launched.
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The defender wishes to optimize defensive pre-
positioning for attack interception while assuming the
attacker will observe these preparations and optimize his
multimissile attack to exploit any weaknesses in these
defenses. The defender’s objective is to minimize the max-
imum total expected damage to targets. We note that this
model is a conservative one for the defender because he
must protect against the worst possible attack. It is con-
servative for the attacker, because he must plan against the
best possible defense. However, variants of the model we
describe later enable analysis of a range of situations, from
conservative to optimistic, for either opponent.
Model JD-MINMAX: Minimize Maximum Expected
Total Damage
Indices and Index Sets
Attacker
m ∈M attacking missile types
s ∈ S attacker launch sites
t ∈ T targets (“defended asset”)
a ∈A attacks (a single missile launched at a
target)
a ∈Ams ⊆A attacks launching a missile of type m from
site s
a ∈At ⊆A attacks a with target t
sa launch site of attack a, sa ∈ S
ma missile type launched in attack a, ma ∈M
ta target of attack a, ta ∈ T
Defender
p ∈ P defending platforms
c ∈C defending platform classes
cp class of platform p, cp ∈C
g ∈G candidate stationing positions for a defending
platform
g ∈Gc ⊆G candidate stationing positions for a defending
platform of class c
i ∈ I defensive interceptor types
d ∈D defense options
Data units
Attacker
mobilem attacker’s total supply of mobile mis-
sile type m (missiles)
fixedms attacker’s total supply of stationary
type m missiles at launch site s
(missiles)
movems , movems minimum and maximum number of
mobile missile type m that attacker can
transport to launch site s (missiles)
missilest maximum number of missiles that can
attack target t (missiles)
valt value of target t (value)
Pka probability that attack a hits and
destroys its target ta if not intercepted,
i.e., probability of kill (fraction)
Defender
loadoutp i number of type i interceptors carried by plat-
form p (interceptors)
salvoa cd i number of type i interceptors used against
attack a by a class c platform exercising
defense option d (interceptors)
shootp maximum number of interceptors platform p
can shoot in an exchange (interceptors)
Pna c gd probability that attack a is negated if plat-
form p, class c = cp, in position g ∈ Gcp




Wms number of type m mobile missiles transported to
launch site s (missiles)
Ya 1 if attack a is launched, 0 otherwise (binary)
(Y, the vector of attacks by individual missiles, is
an “attack plan”)
Defender
Xpg 1 if platform p is positioned at g, 0 otherwise
(binary)
Rapgd 1 if attack a is engaged by platform p from
position g ∈Gcp exercising defense option d, 0
otherwise (binary)
Formulation of JD-MINMAX. We specify a set of
dual variables, in square brackets, for each constraint of
the inner (maximization) problem in JD-MINMAX. These
duals are only defined (and used) for solutions to the linear
programming relaxation of the integer linear program that


























Yafixedms ∀ms ms A2
∑
a∈At
Yamissilest ∀ t t A3
movemsWmsmovems and integer
∀ms − ms 	 ms A4
0Ya1 and integer ∀a !a" A5


The notation XR ∈ XR denotes all feasible pre-
positioning and interception plans for the defender. This
feasible set is described in detail below.
The attacker’s objective (A0) expresses total expected
target damage, assuming a cumulative effect across tar-
gets, and for multiple missiles striking a single target.
Constraints (A1) limit the number of mobile missiles of
each type that can be transported to launch sites. Con-
straints (A2) limit the maximum number of missiles of each
type, both mobile and fixed, that can be launched from each
launch site. Constraints (A3) limit the number of missiles
that can attack each target. Constraints (A4) limit the num-
ber of mobile missiles of each type that can be transported
to each launch site.
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The objective (A0) expresses expected incremental target
value damage inflicted as a consequence of each attack-
ing missile. For an area target, such as a city or airfield,
such a cumulative damage model is standard (e.g., Eckler
and Burr 1972). But a point target might be destroyed by
any single attacking missile, and the lack of a joint prob-
ability expression for surviving more than one hit means
that the attacker can be over-credited with damage value.
(This problem disappears if the attacker can launch no
more than one missile at any target, which can be enforced
through constraints (A3).) We believe that when it comes to
weapons of mass destruction carried by TBMs, the damage
to an economy and a society will continue to increase as the
number of successful missile strikes increases. Thus, the
cumulative model of damage is appropriate, although there
might be some diminishing returns to an attacker as the
number of successful strikes on a target (or in a target area)
increases. Appendix A suggests how to modify the objec-
tive function for diminishing returns or point targets, should
these issues arise.
The defender’s actions are limited by XR ∈ XR,
where XR is defined by the following set of constraints:∑
g
Xpg  1 ∀p (D1)
∑
p
Xpg  1 ∀g (optional) (D2)
∑
pgd
Rap gd  1 ∀a (D3)
∑
ad
salvoa cpd iRapgd  loadoutp iXpg ∀p i g ∈Gcp
(D4)∑
agd
salvoa cpd iRap gd  shootp ∀p (optional) (D5)
∑
d
Rapgd Xpg ∀ap g (D6)
all XpgRapgd ∈ #01$" (D7)
Each constraint (D1) limits a platform to occupy at most
one grid position; each constraint (D2) optionally limits a
grid position to accommodate at most one platform; each
constraint (D3) allows at most one interception of each
attack; each constraint (D4) limits the number of intercep-
tor engagements from each positioned platform and grid-
point combination; each constraint (D5) optionally limits
the total number of interceptors that a platform can shoot in
the short period of time that elapses in an exchange; each
constraint (D6) permits an engagement only from an occu-
pied platform and grid-point combination; and constraints
(D7) require binary decisions. Note that constraints (D3) do
not require a response for every attacking missile. Indeed,
if defenses are overwhelmed, it may be impossible to inter-
cept every missile launched, and we must allow for this
eventuality.
The attacker plans to maximize expected damage, and
the defender plans to minimize the attacker’s maximum
expected damage.
2.3. Solving JD-MINMAX with JD-MILP
Direct solution of a min-max model like JD-MINMAX
is impossible with standard software. We could create a
specialized decomposition algorithm for solving it, along
the lines of Israeli and Wood (2002), but prefer a simpler
method if one exists. In this case it does: Although the
attacker’s decision vector W is integer and Y is binary, the
constraint matrix involving W and Y is totally unimodu-
lar and all corresponding right-hand side data are integer.
Thus, all solutions to the linear-programming relaxation of
the attacker’s maximizing problem are intrinsically inte-
ger. Therefore, we can simply take the linear-programming
relaxation of the inner problem to create an inner maxi-
mization that is a linear program. We then use the dual
variables defined above, and take the dual of that inner
maximization to create a “min-min” problem. This results
in a simple, minimizing MILP, which we solve using stan-
























s.t. m−ms − ms + 	 ms  0 ∀ms (T1)
ma sa +ta + !a+
∑
pgd
PkavaltaPna cp gdRap gd
 Pkavalta ∀a (T2)∑
g
Xpg  1 ∀p (T3)
∑
p
Xpg  1 ∀g (T4)
∑
pgd
Rap gd  1 ∀a (T5)
∑
ad
salvoa cpd iRap gd − loadoutp iXpg  0
∀p i g ∈Gcp (T6)∑
agd
salvoa cpd iRap gd  shootp ∀p (T7)
∑
d
Rapgd Xpg ∀ap g (T8)
all mms a ms 	 ms  0
all XpgRapgd ∈ #01$" (T9)
The solution of JD-MILP yields an optimal defense pre-
positioning plan X∗ and interceptor-commitment plan R∗.
We recover the associated, optimal mobile-missile trans-
port plan W∗ and attack plan Y∗ by fixing X = X∗ and
R=R∗ in JD-MINMAX, and solving the linear program
that results.
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JD-MILP can be embellished with additional features
as long as the modifications can be expressed linearly
in XR ∈ XR, and the embellishments that modify the
attacker’s constraints (A1)–(A5) do not destroy their total
unimodularity. (If maintaining total unimodularity in the
attacker’s optimization is too restrictive, more general solu-
tion methods apply, as mentioned above.)
2.4. Variants of JOINT DEFENDER to Assess the
Value of Flexibility
By tightening or relaxing constraints (D1)–(D7) on the
defender and solving the resulting versions of JD-MILP, we
can assess the value of flexibility, or the lack thereof, to the
defender. For instance, a commander might not currently
be able to place an AEGIS platform in a set of positions G′
that is threatened by the adversary’s coastal defenses. The
commander could solve JD-MILP with and without G′
included in G, and determine whether or not it is worth-
while to neutralize those coastal defenses. (This compar-
ison we envisage still assumes transparency between the
sides, and that the attacker will know that his defenses have
been neutralized and that the previously inaccessible posi-
tions are now available to the defender.)
2.5. The Value of Secrecy
JD-MILP’s assumption of complete transparency between
attacker and defender can lead to unappealing (but logi-
cal) outcomes. Suppose, for example, that a defender has
two assets to defend, has two interceptors for that defense,
and each interceptor has a Pn of 1. Further, assume that he
is opposed by an attacker who has two missiles that can
strike either target (asset), each with a Pk of 1. Because
the attacker can see the defender’s preparations, he will
destroy at least one target—with probability 1. This may be
unappealing because, in the familiar setting of a two-person
zero-sum game with randomized strategies, the defender
can have a positive probability of losing neither of his
assets. Of course, the game-theoretic setting requires opac-
ity, i.e., each opponent must hide his intentions from the
other. But, completely hiding missile launch sites and inter-
ceptor platforms such as ships is impossible.
On the other hand, both attacker and defender probably
do not have complete knowledge of their opponent’s plans.
To handle this issue, we can modify JD-MINMAX, and
JD-MILP correspondingly, to represent situations in which
some of the defender’s assets are hidden from the attacker,
and/or some launch sites or missiles are hidden from the
defender. We refer to the defender being able to conceal
part of his decision, fooling the attacker into basing his
strategy on partial, or bogus data, and then taking advantage
of that deception. This section discusses this case and its
converse, where the attacker can conceal some information
from the defender.
The Value of Defender Secrecy. The following proce-
dure will evaluate the advantage the defender can gain by
hiding the existence of a subset of his platforms from the
attacker:
(1) Solve the standard version of JD-MILP to determine
total expected damage Z∗ under the assumption that the
defender’s platforms are all visible to the attacker.
(2) Remove platforms whose existence the defender can
hide; the attacker knows nothing whatsoever about these
platforms.
(3) Solve this modified version of JD-MILP for the vis-
ible defense strategy X∗R∗, and recover the attacker’s
optimal strategy Y∗.
(4) Fix the “visible-defense strategy” X∗R∗ and the
unsuspecting attacker’s strategy Y∗ in JD-MINMAX and
solve the defender’s minimization to determine the optimal
strategy for the hidden platforms, and the total expected
damage Z∗∗, given the attacker’s obviously suboptimal
strategy.
(5) Because of the attacker’s suboptimal strategy, Z∗∗ 
Z∗, so that Z∗ − Z∗∗ may be viewed as “the value of
secrecy” to the defender.
If we hide all defending platforms, and use this pro-
cedure, we are estimating the “value of a total surprise
defense.” (This emulates current planning tools.)
The Value of Attacker Secrecy. Suppose that the
defender has gained enough information to be able to, in
essence, fix all the variables Wms in JD-MINMAX. That
is, he knows the exact location of every missile the attacker
possesses. Both sides solve the resulting restricted version
of JD-MILP and determine the total expected damage Z∗∗;
let X∗∗ represent the defender’s optimal pre-positioning
plan for this situation. Now, if the attacker can transport
his missiles from site to site without being observed, and
do this optimally, he may be able to increase expected
damage, because the defender has been fooled and will
use his original, now suboptimal, pre-positioning plan X∗∗.
So, the attacker solves JD-MILP with X fixed at X∗∗ (for
simplicity, we allow the defender to reoptimize interceptor
commitments R), determines an optimal “missile-transport
plan” W∗, and optimal attack plan Y∗ with objective
value Z∗. Clearly, Z∗∗  Z∗, and the difference Z∗ − Z∗∗
represents the value of secrecy to the attacker.
Suppose that the attacker can fool the defender into
thinking he will never launch his missiles, or that he
has none at all. In that case, X∗∗R∗∗ = 00, i.e., no
defense, is a reasonable response from the defender. If we
fix XR= 00 in JD-MINMAX and solve the resulting
linear program to obtain Z∗, we can determine the “value
of a total surprise attack” by comparing Z∗ to the opti-
mal objective from JD-MILP for a baseline, nonsurprise
scenario.
3. Case Study: North Korea, Circa 2010
We have developed two North Korean scenarios, circa
2010, which specify a North Korean arsenal of ballistic
missiles and launch sites, a U.S. contingent of ballistic mis-
sile defense platforms, and a list of targets with associated
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target values. We use these scenarios, and variants, to
demonstrate JOINT DEFENDER. In the basic scenario we
put each North Korean missile at a specific launch site, but
we also report cases in which the missiles are transportable.
When no confusion results, we use the term JOINT
DEFENDER to mean JD-MINMAX, or JD-MILP, or the
full decision-support system that incorporates these models,
prepares data for problem generation, solves the problem,
and returns solutions in accessible format.
3.1. The Attacker’s Launch Sites
The attacker’s hypothetical missile launch sites are based
on known North Korean missile facilities and bases taken
from unclassified sources (Federation of American Scien-
tists 2003). Table 1 lists these sites, and Figure 4 shows
their approximate locations.
3.2. Attacker Missiles
Table 2 displays the selection of missiles from the North
Korean inventory we model in this scenario, along with
their approximate minimum and maximum ranges. These
ranges have been compiled from unclassified sources (e.g.,
Jane’s 2003d). We assume that each missile hits and
destroys its assigned target with perfect reliability, i.e.,
Pka = 1"0 for any a, if the missile is not intercepted. This
expresses the worst-case situation.
3.3. Targets on a Defended Asset List (DAL)
Table 3 displays the defended asset list (DAL) and target
values for all scenarios, and Figure 5 displays target loca-
tions on an area map. We generate target values for the
Table 1. North Korean launch sites (after Federation of American Scientists 2003). These comprise current North
Korean missile-production facilities and missile bases, and are used in our scenarios as potential launch sites.
For fixed-launch-site scenarios, the maximum number and type of each North Korean ballistic missile is
shown for each launch site. When we permit transporting mobile missiles, this same inventory of Scud-B,
Scud-C, and No-Dong missiles is mobile.
Missile types
Latitude Longitude
Launch sites (N) (E) Scud-B Scud-C No-Dong Taep’o-Dong I Taep’o-Dong II
Chiha-ri 3837′ 12641′ 15 20 10
Chunggang-up 4146′ 12653′ 10 10
Kanggamchan 4024′ 12512′ 15 10
Kanggye 4007′ 12635′ 15 10
Mari’gyongdae-ri 3859′ 12540′ 10 20 10
Mayang 4000′ 12811′ 15 20
Namgung-ri 3908′ 12546′ 5 15 2 1 1
No-dong 4050′ 12940′ 5 15 1 1
Ok’pyong 3917′ 12718′ 15 15 10
Paegun 3958′ 12435′ 15 10
Pyongyang 3900′ 12545′ 15 15 10
Sangwon 3850′ 12605′ 15 20 10
Sunchon 3925′ 12555′ 5 15 10
Tokch’on 3945′ 12615′ 5 15 15
Toksong 4025′ 12810′ 5 15 15
Yong-don 4159′ 12958′ 20 1 1






















DAL based upon a subjective assessment of the four factors
currently used in air-defense planning: criticality, vulnera-
bility, reconstitutability, and threat (e.g., Department of the
Army Field Manuals FM 3-01.11 2000a and FM 44-100
2000b).
Target t’s criticality ct judges the degree to which an
asset is essential to the defender. A high value indicates
that the asset is extremely critical, and a low value indicates
otherwise.
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Table 2. North Korean ballistic missile types with their
range limits. The Scud-B, Scud-C, and No-
Dong missiles are operational today; the inter-






Taep’o-Dong I 2200 2900
Taep’o-Dong II 3500 4300
Vulnerability vt represents the degree to which a target
is susceptible to an air or missile attack or is vulnerable
to surveillance. A high value indicates that the target is
extremely vulnerable, i.e., unprotected and in the open; a
low value indicates otherwise.
Reconstitutability rt assesses the degree to which the tar-
get can recover from inflicted damage, and incorporates
time, the need or lack of need for special repair equipment,
and the amount of manpower required to resume normal
operation. A high value indicates that the target would need
considerable time, equipment and/or manpower to return to
normal operation following an attack; a low value indicates
otherwise.
Threat ht subjectively estimates the probability of a tar-
get being attacked. A high value indicates that it is nearly
certain that the enemy will attack this target.
We combine these factors through
valt = lnct × vt × rt ×ht+ 1
where all ct , vt , rt , and ht range from about 1 to about 10.
The natural log function (ln) is chosen somewhat arbitrarily
so that valt also ranges from about 1 to 10. Our definition
Table 3. Targets on a defended asset list (DAL). Targets are on this list because of their political or military
significance and are spread out over South Korea, the main islands of Japan, and Okinawa. Each tar-
get is assigned four scores, reflecting criticality, vulnerability, reconstitutability, and threat. For example,
Seoul has c v rh values of 4859, which result in a target value of ln4 × 8 × 5 × 9 + 1 = 8"3.
The example values shown here are completely arbitrary.
Latitude Longitude
Target (N) (E) c v r h val
Atsugi, JP 3527′ 13927′ 4 7 6 5 7.7
Misawa, JP 4042′ 14125′ 8 5 7 5 8.2
Okinawa, JP 2620′ 12747′ 7 7 8 3 8.1
Sasebo, JP 3309′ 12944′ 7 8 7 7 8.9
Tokyo, JP 3541′ 14000′ 4 9 4 7 7.9
Yokosuka, JP 3517′ 13940′ 8 8 7 7 9.1
Chinhae, ROK 3508′ 12841′ 7 7 7 8 8.9
Inchon, ROK 3729′ 12638′ 3 6 5 4 6.9
Kunsan, ROK 3554′ 12637′ 10 7 9 10 9.7
Osan AB, ROK 3706′ 12702′ 10 8 9 10 9.9
Pusan, ROK 3506′ 12902′ 8 7 8 10 9.4
Seoul, ROK 3727′ 12657′ 4 8 5 9 8.3
Table 4. Ranges for each defender
interceptor.





SM2 block III variants 120
SM3 1200
of target value can be replaced, but any alternative should
address these four important components.
Initially, we allow a defended target to be attacked at
most once. We want results that are easy to visualize, so
we present point targets, easily located on a map.
3.4. Defensive Platforms
To evaluate the defender’s 2010 defense plan, we assume
that two AEGIS cruisers are deployed, each with 10 SM3
and 20 SM2 interceptors, along with one AEGIS destroyer
with 20 SM2 interceptors. Each AEGIS ship has been con-
figured for ballistic-missile defense and deploys as an inde-
pendent entity.
The defender also has two land-based defensive assets.
He can use one PATRIOT battery, which consists of eight
mobile launchers (and support vehicles), each loaded with
four PAC-3 missiles, two PAC-2 GEM missiles, and one
PAC-2 missile. And, he can use one THAAD battery
whose salient features comprise a mobile launcher and
10 interceptors.
3.5. Interceptor Ranges
Table 4 specifies the maximum range of the various inter-
ceptors used by defense platforms in our scenario. Ranges
are gleaned from the open literature (Jane’s 2003b, c, e).
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Figure 5. Candidate platform positions for the defender. Each circle in Japan and South Korea represents a target; each
diamond in North Korea represents an attacker launch site; sea-based platforms can be located at any grid
point at sea; land-based platforms can be based at any grid point on land excluding those in North Korea and
China (the upper left-hand corner); land-based platforms can also be collocated with targets. For simplicity,
grid points are placed at each integer value of latitude and longitude. In reality, the defender’s candidate
locations could be specified with much greater freedom.
3.6. Interceptor Effectiveness: Probability of
Negation (Pn)
For simplicity, these test cases assume “reasonable engage-
ment conditions,” which means that a nonterminal intercep-
tor is within range of an attacking missile’s trajectory, or a
terminal defender is, effectively, collocated with the target
of an attack. When these conditions are met, we set the
probability of negation (Pn) for an interceptor to a reason-
able but hypothetical value between 0.7 and 0.9, and set it
to 0.0 otherwise. Alternatively, JOINT DEFENDER could
employ a set of (potentially enormous) tables that pro-
vide interceptor effectiveness indexed by interceptor type
and engagement geometry as specified by cross-range and
down-range proximity, and by the attacking missile’s alti-
tude. (With respect to the great circle arc connecting the
launch site to the target of the attacking missile, the “cross-
range” proximity is the distance from the defending plat-
form to the closest point of the arc, and the “down-range”
proximity is the distance from this closest point to the
target.)
We derive the joint probability that a salvo of interceptors
negates an attacker’s missile from the negation probabilities
of the missiles that comprise a salvo. In this paper, we
assume independence between interceptors in a salvo, but
JOINT DEFENDER does not require this.
3.7. Candidate Defender Positions
We discretize candidate defender positions into a latitude
and longitude grid with increments of one degree, about
60 nautical miles; see Figure 5. This discretization yields
304 candidate grid locations for pre-positioning interceptor
platforms, although geography precludes certain classes
from being assigned to certain positions. Terminal defen-
sive platforms can also collocate with targets. In addition
to obvious restrictions to locate land units on land, and to
position ships at sea, we have defined an optional, restricted
set of sea positions that are at least 100 nautical miles from
the North Korean coast. This puts the ships outside of the
60 nautical-mile range of North Korea’s shore-based HY-1
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Silkworm and HY-2 Seersucker anti-ship missiles (Federa-
tion of American Scientists 2004, Department of the Army
1999).
Our approach does not depend on the structure of the
set of candidate locations; we only require that the list be
finite. In a real scenario the area commander might nom-
inate a list of candidate positions for JOINT DEFENDER
to evaluate based on his expert knowledge of the theater
and the capabilities of the platforms under his command.
3.8. Scenario Variants
We develop a sequence of scenario variants to illustrate
how the defender or attacker can evaluate flexibility in their
strategy.
We depict postures for the defender in which:
(D1) The defender does nothing. This establishes a
worst-case baseline for any surprise attack.
(D2) The defender hides nothing, including his com-
mitments to intercept each potential attacking missile.
This is the completely flexible and transparent case where
attacker and defender each have complete knowledge of
each other’s plans.
(D3) The defender lets his platform locations be seen,
keeps his ships out of range of shore-based anti-ship mis-
siles, and hides his interceptor commitments.
(D4) The defender lets his platform locations be seen,
suppresses shore-based threats to his ships as necessary,
positions his ships as close to shore as he pleases, and hides
his interceptor commitments.
(D5) The defender hides the positions of his ships, does
not hide the positions of his ground-based interceptors, but
does hide all interceptor commitments.
(D6) The defender hides everything so that the defense
is a complete surprise to the attacker. This establishes a
best-case baseline for whatever the attacker decides to
do. (This is the case assumed by current TBMD planning
tools.)
Posture D2 is our baseline. JD-MINMAX represents this
“perfectly transparent” case by allowing the attacker to see
both the defender’s pre-positioning decisions X, as well as
his interceptor commitments R. This constitutes a restric-
tion of the defender’s capabilities in a real engagement, in
which (a) the attacker would observe only the defender’s
pre-positioning; (b) he would plan and launch an attack
given that information; (c) the defender would observe the
attack; (d) and only then, after knowing the details of the
attack, would the defender need to commit (allocate) inter-
ceptors from his pre-positioned platforms. The unrestricted
model would be, however, significantly harder to solve than
JD-MINMAX.
In postures D3 through D5, we relax our baseline pos-
ture to model the case in which the attacker has information
about the locations of some or all of the defensive plat-
forms but does not know specific interceptor commitments.
Exact solution of this model would also be difficult, so
we approximate this situation by (a) solving JD-MINMAX
as if the defender were using posture D2 (revealing both
position and intercept commitments), (b) fixing the result-
ing attack plan, and then (c) letting the defender re-allocate
his interceptors to engage the attacking missiles more
effectively.
In addition, we evaluate postures D7 through D10 under
the same assumptions as D4, with one defending plat-
form of each type omitted from the theater. (Specifically,
D7 omits CG48, D8 omits DDG68, D9 omits Pbat1, and
D10 omits Tbat1; see platform names in Table 6.)
We depict postures for the attacker in which:
(A1) The attacker must use a fixed launch site for each
missile, or
(A2) The attacker transports mobile missiles in secret to
any launch site he chooses, while deceiving the defender
into expecting fixed launch sites.
4. Results and Analysis
We generate JD-MILP using the general algebraic mod-
eling system (GAMS) (Brooke et al. 1998) and solve it
with CPLEX 9.0 (ILOG 2003) on a 2 GHz laptop com-
puter operating under Windows XP (Microsoft Corporation
2004). The largest models encountered in analyzing the
North Korean cases have, after filtering and presolve reduc-
tions, about 120,000 binary variables, 250 continuous vari-
ables, and 6,000 constraints. In our experience, posture D6
(a surprise defense, the case assumed by current TBMD
planning tools) can be solved optimally in a few seconds.
A good solution to the more nuanced cases, such as posture
D2 (where attacker and defender have complete knowl-
edge of each other), is discovered within a minute or two,
although proving near optimality with a 1% relative toler-
ance can take a half hour or more.
4.1. Multimissile Attack with No Defense
Table 5 lists an optimal multimissile attack that launches
a single missile from each fixed launch site at an unde-
fended target. This produces a total expected damage of
103.0 (each attacking missile is assumed to hit its target).
In this “posture,” D1-A1, the defender does nothing and
the attacker uses fixed launch sites.
Figure 6 illustrates the tracks that attacking missiles
would follow in this scenario.
4.2. An Optimal Defense Plan
Assuming that the attacker does not observe defensive
preparations, the defender positions his assets to intercept
an optimal, theaterwide attack (this is posture D6-A1, with
positions shown in Table 6), and reduces expected dam-
age from 103.0 to 1.0. The defender knows in advance
about all optimal attack opportunities, so he positions his
defensive platforms and engages the attacker’s missiles
with interceptors having high probabilities of negation. The
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Table 5. An optimal, theaterwide undefended attack plan. There are no defensive interceptions at
all. Each target on the defended asset list is attacked with a single missile producing a
combined expected damage of 103.0. (See map in Figure 6.)
Expected
Target Launch site Missile type damage
Atsugi, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 7.7
Misawa, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 8.2
Okinawa, JP Chiha-ri No-Dong 8.1
Sasebo, JP Chiha-ri Scud-C 8.9
Tokyo, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 7.9
Yokosuka, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 9.1
Chinhae, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-C 8.9
Inchon, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-B 6.9
Kunsan, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-B 9.7
Osan AB, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-B 9.9
Pusan, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-C 9.4
Seoul, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-B 8.3
Figure 6. Map of an optimal, theaterwide undefended attack plan. Maximal attacks are shown with at most one missile
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Table 6. Optimal defender positions maintaining defense secrecy against an opti-
mal theaterwide attack. From these (hidden) positions, defending platforms
intercept all attacking missiles, but do not necessarily destroy every missile
intercepted. The maximum expected damage is reduced to 1.0, or about
one-tenth of an attacking missile leaking through.
Latitude Longitude
Defender class Platform (N) (E)
AEGIS CG CG47 3500′ 13000′
AEGIS CG CG48 3400′ 12900′
AEGIS DDG DDG68 3600′ 12600′
PATRIOT Pbat1 3706′ 12702′
THAAD Tbat1 4042′ 14125′
expected damage, evaluating to 1.0, derives from approx-
imately one-tenth of an attacking missile leaking through
over all engagements.
Figure 7 illustrates the defender’s positions relative to an
optimal attack plan, and the subsequent, optimal engage-
ments of the plan’s attacking missiles.
4.3. Assume Transparency: A Two-Sided
Optimization
If each side can observe everything the other intends to do,
the attacker knows that the defender may commit an inter-
ceptor salvo to each candidate missile attack, and shoot
it if he launches that missile. The defender knows that
the attacker may get some of his missiles through. The
defender’s objective is to minimize maximum expected
damage, given the attacker can see and take advantage of
pre-positioned, defensive forces. This is posture D2-A1.
The two-sided attack and defense produces an optimal
set of interceptor commitments against threatened launches
and shots at missiles launched, as well as, perhaps, some
launches against which there is no available defense. Here,
the expected damage of 22.7 represents loss of undefended
targets Inchon and Chinhae, but still represents an over-
all reduction in expected damage from a surprise attack of
78 percent. Inchon and Chinhae are undefended because
available interceptors cannot cover all possible attacking
missiles.
In posture D4-A1 we model the situation where the
attacker observes platform positions for the defender,
but the defender keeps his interception decisions secret.
Tables 7 and 8, respectively, illustrate such a defense and
the attacking missiles engaged, and Figure 8 depicts the
missile attacks, defense, and engagements on a map of the
theater.
4.4. A More Stressful Scenario Showing How to
Evaluate Partial Transparency, Secrecy,
Deception, and the Incremental Value of
Each Defender Platform
Now consider a more stressful case for the defender
that is too cluttered to illustrate on a map of the the-
ater. Suppose that the attacker can launch as many as
three missiles of any type from any launch site, and that
each target can be attacked as many as 10 times. Pos-
ture D3-A1 exhibits 96 attacks, defended by 53 inter-
cepting salvos using 90 interceptors. Total expected target
damage is 394.4, with 43 attacking missiles expected to
leak through defenses. Maintaining total defender secrecy,
D6-A1, reduces total expected damage to 152.2.
Suppose that the defender can keep naval defensive plat-
forms hidden from the attacker, but the attacker can observe
all land-based defenses; this is posture D5-A1. The result-
ing expected damage changes from the upper bound of
total transparency toward the lower bound of total defender
secrecy; see Figure 9. The difference between the expected
damage in the transparent solution and the expected dam-
age of this solution is the value of partial defender secrecy.
In practical terms, this value quantifies how an increase
in information hiding either through funding, strategy, or
a combination of both, will reduce the attacker’s ability to
inflict damage.
The value of partial defender secrecy is bounded by
the difference between the expected damage of the com-
pletely transparent solution and the expected damage given
complete defender secrecy. In the latter case, the defender
knows which individual attacks will occur and hides the
existence of all interceptors from the attacker (with result-
ing value 394"4− 152"2= 242"2).
The attacker may gain some advantage from secretly
transporting missiles to alternative launch sites. Defending
ships are most affected by this deception. In contrast, the
PATRIOT battery provides a terminal defense that is rel-
atively insensitive to an incoming missile’s track, which
depends on its origin.
We present defensive postures D7 through D10 to assess
the value of each defending platform. Here, we assume that
posture D4 applies (platforms are seen by the attacker, but
engagements are concealed), as one platform of each type is
successively removed. Table 9 shows the value of each plat-
form, estimated by comparison with all platforms available.
The Patriot battery is valuable in both fixed and mobile
attack-missile postures (∼90 units of expected damage);
the Aegis cruiser is more valuable in the mobile attack pos-
ture (∼110 units of expected damage), but has low value in
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Figure 7. Map of optimal defender positions and engagements when defense secrecy is maintained against an optimal,
theaterwide attack. From these (hidden) positions, defending platforms intercept all attacking missiles, but do
not necessarily destroy every missile intercepted. The maximum expected damage is reduced to 1.0, which






Table 7. Optimal defending platform positions given that these positions are observed by the
attacker, but defending interceptor commitments are kept secret. Each defending plat-
form is positioned to minimize the attacker’s worst possible attack. The defender, while
determining his platform positions, commits interceptors to thwart potential missile
attacks that may not actually be launched, but will be intercepted if they are. Once
positioned, the defender can intercept any attacking missile he chooses. (See map in
Figure 8.)
Latitude Longitude
Defender class Platform (N) (E)
AEGIS CG CG47 3400′ 13000′
AEGIS CG CG48 3600′ 12600′
AEGIS DDG DDG68 3500′ 13000′
PATRIOT Pbat1 3727′ 12657′
THAAD Tbat1 4000′ 14000′
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Table 8. An optimal attack plan given that defending platform positions are observed by the attacker,
but defending interceptor commitments are kept secret. Each target is attacked with at most
one missile. The defender, while determining his platform positions, commits interceptors
to thwart potential attacks that may not actually be launched, but will be intercepted if
they are. Once positioned, the defender can intercept any attacking missile he chooses.
Total defended asset list target value at risk is 103.0 and expected target damage is 1.0.
(See map in Figure 8.)
Target Launch site Missile type Salvo option Salvo Pn Defender Expected damage
Atsugi, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 2 SM3 0.99 CG48 0.1
Misawa, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 2 SM3 0.99 CG48 0.1
Okinawa, JP Chiha-ri No-Dong 2 SM3 0.99 CG47 0.1
Sasebo, JP Chiha-ri Scud-C 2 SM2-III 0.99 CG47 0.1
Tokyo, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 2 SM3 0.99 CG47 0.1
Yokosuka, JP Kanggamchan No-Dong 2 SM3 0.99 CG47 0.1
Chinhae, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-C 2 SM2-III 0.99 DDG68 0.1
Inchon, ROK Namgung-ri Scud-C 2 PAC3 0.99 Pbat1 0.1
Kunsan, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-B 2 SM2-III 0.99 CG48 0.1
Osan AB, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-B 2 PAC3 0.99 Pbat1 0.1
Pusan, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-C 2 SM2-III 0.99 DDG68 0.1
Seoul, ROK Chiha-ri Scud-C 2 PAC3 0.99 Pbat1 0.1
Figure 8. Map of an optimal theaterwide attack given that defending platform positions are observed by the attacker,
but defending interceptor commitments are kept secret. Each target is attacked with at most one missile. The
defender, while determining his platform positions, commits interceptors to thwart potential attacks that may
not actually be launched, but will be intercepted if they are. Once positioned, the defender can intercept any
attacking missile he chooses. Total defended asset list target value at risk is 103.0 and expected target damage
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Figure 9. Minimized maximum expected target damage for 20 scenarios mixing defense and attack postures. From D1
to D6, the defender works harder and harder to intercept attacks and conceals more and more information
from the attacker, while the attacker either has known, observed launch sites (vertical scale A1) or mobile
launch sites hidden from the defender (vertical scale A2). For example, with defending ships hidden from
the attacker, posture D5-A1 has expected damage 355.5 with known, fixed attack launch sites, or 394.7 if the
attacking missiles can be transported to surprise launch sites D5-A2. Moving defending ships out of range
of shore-based anti-ship missiles, D2, does not degrade the defense. The value of secrecy is the positive
difference between the expected damage under that level of secrecy and the expected damage in the fully
transparent model (e.g., the value of complete defender secrecy is 456"1− 152"2= 303"9).





















Table 9. Defensive postures D7 through D10 show the effect of removing one of each type of
defender platform from the scenario. Posture D4 provides a baseline for comparison. In
each scenario, the remaining platforms reposition and resort to defensive salvos using fewer
interceptors. For instance, when launch locations are fixed, removing one Aegis cruiser
(CG48) results in a moderate increase in expected target damage 398"5− 394"4= 4"1.
But, when launch sites are mobile, removing the same platform results in a dramatic
increase in expected target damage 504"3− 394"4= 109"9.
A1: Fixed A2: Mobile
launch sites launch sites
Expected Increase Expected Increase
Posture damage from D4 damage from D4
D4: All platforms 394.4 0"0 394.4 0"0
seen (baseline)
D7: Remove CG48 398.5 4"1 504.3 109"9
D8: Remove DDG68 432.6 38"2 432.6 38"2
D9: Remove Pbat1 482.6 88"2 482.6 88"2
D10: Remove Tbat1 404.4 10"0 404.4 10"0
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the fixed-launch-site attack posture (∼4 units of expected
damage).
5. Conclusions
We have introduced JOINT DEFENDER, a new optimi-
zation-based decision-support tool for pre-positioning
theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) assets, i.e.,
missile-interceptor platforms. JOINT DEFENDER can
model a scenario in which both attacker and defender
have knowledge of the other’s strategy, it can model no
defense at all, and it can model an optimal defense against
an attack assuming that the attacker expects no defense.
Existing defensive planning tools can only evaluate the
last type of scenario, and then, only approximately. JOINT
DEFENDER solves such problems exactly on a laptop
computer in just a few seconds.
JOINT DEFENDER can also model a more compli-
cated scenario in which a defender first pre-positions his
TBMD platforms to protect a set of targets. An attacker
observes those defensive positions and, given that infor-
mation, launches his missiles so as to maximize the total
expected value of target damage. The defender can opti-
mize his pre-positioning (and commitments of intercep-
tors to attacking missiles), because he knows the attacker
will behave to optimize his own objective function. The
attacker cannot increase expected damage by using any
other strategy.
We develop JOINT DEFENDER as a bilevel integer lin-
ear program, but convert it to a standard mixed-integer lin-
ear program for solution purposes. We have demonstrated
its practicability by solving a number of realistic scenarios
involving North Korea, using data gleaned from public
sources. We have also explored the “value of secrecy” to
both sides of the conflict. JOINT DEFENDER identifies an
optimal plan for a typical transparent scenario in a minute
or two on a laptop computer, although we find instances
that require one half hour to prove optimality.
Two-sided mathematical models of military conflict have
been studied since Lanchester (1916). Danskin (1967,
p. viii) recounts that, in 1951, the Rand Corporation studied
two-sided situations where “one side allocates anti-missile
defenses to various cities. The other side observes this
allocation and then allocates missiles to those cities.” In
discussing defense against nuclear strikes, and in addition
to using a dual reformulation from max-min to max-max,
Owen (1969, p. 491) states: “It is, of course, assumed that
the defender must deploy his hardware first; the attacker,
in full knowledge of this deployment, will act next.” In
Appendix B, we establish the relationship between our two-
sided model (JD-MINMAX) in JOINT DEFENDER and a
game invented by von Stackelberg (1952). These seminal
contributions, achieved solely with classical mathematics
(i.e., with no computers) but only by asserting many simpli-
fying assumptions (such as continuous activities) still offer
prescient insight. We have now discovered how to actually
formulate and solve such problems with realistic fidelity.
In contrast to our bilevel optimization, a standard game-
theoretic model would assume that the attacker does not
observe the positioning of defensive assets before launch-
ing his attack, and the defender is unaware of the allocation
of attacking missiles to targets (e.g., Matheson 1975), or
that either side is unaware of the total number of assets
(offensive or defensive) possessed by the adversary. Eckler
and Burr (1972) discuss solutions for many versions of
such games. Bracken et al. (1987) discuss solutions that
are robust with respect to uncertain numbers of attacking
assets.
Diehl (2004) provides the contemporary (unclassified)
foundation for JOINT DEFENDER, discusses the philoso-
phy of target damage functions, and suggests some alterna-
tive solution strategies that we have not pursued here.
JOINT DEFENDER represents a substantial technologi-
cal advance over existing TBMD planning tools that employ
heuristics, or expect the planner to guess at good defense
plans, or require supercomputers for implementation. None
of these existing tools assumes that the attacker can detect
defensive preparations and respond accordingly—this is a
key weakness addressed by JOINT DEFENDER.
Planners are comfortable with a decision-support tool
they can control, so JOINT DEFENDER accepts advice
such as “fix this platform in this position,” “try this position
first,” or “we have no advice to offer.” Similarly, JOINT
DEFENDER accepts, but does not require, other advice on
the details of an interception plan, including “evaluate this
exact plan.”
The Joint Task Force’s area air defense commander
and regional air defense commander can use JOINT
DEFENDER for initial defense planning and assessment,
and for assessing the value of hiding information from the
attacker. JOINT DEFENDER can also provide insight to
TBMD program officers in Washington, DC. For instance,
it can evaluate trade-offs between investing in a few, highly
effective but expensive interceptors or in larger numbers of
relatively inexpensive, but less effective interceptors.
JOINT DEFENDER has been presented to Naval War-
fare Development Command (NWDC), to the United States
Strategic Command program and requirements staff, and
has undergone additional proof testing with a number of
scenarios of interest to these organizations. The NWDC’s
air defense department head, Captain Garry Holmstrom,
USN (ret), has stated, “This project has produced a most
promising solution to the Joint as well as the Navy’s prob-
lem of BMD asset allocation, at minimal development and
fielding cost.” JOINT DEFENDER is now under further
development for NWDC in preparation for further test-
ing and future integration into the TBMD planning envi-
ronment, and for potential use in the Global Command
and Control System-Maritime and/or the Area Air Defense
Command System-lite.
6. Epilogue
On or about 1 October 2004, the USS Curtis Wilbur, a
destroyer of the U.S. 7th Fleet, began patrolling the Sea of
Brown et al.: A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
762 Operations Research 53(5), pp. 745–763, © 2005 INFORMS
Japan as our first step in building a missile shield for the
United States and its allies (Army Times 2004).
Appendix A. Variations on JD-MINMAX’S
Objective Function
The objective function (A0) models area targets that can
be damaged more than once, but not point targets that can
be destroyed just once (e.g., Eckler and Burr 1972). If we
partition the set of targets T into area and point targets, i.e.,
T = #Tarea Tpoint$, the following objective function models
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But, our linear-programming subproblem for the attacker
no longer suffices.
On the other hand, one can argue that, even in the case
of area targets, the damage resulting from multiple suc-
cessful strikes is not additive. For instance, the economy
and welfare of a city might suffer almost as much from a
single successful missile strike as from two. Ignoring vari-
ations in weapon types for simplicity, a sensible modeling
technique makes the expected value of a set of successful
strikes on a target a concave function of the expected num-
ber of such strikes. (Indeed, the simple point-target model
fits this description.) We can accommodate this by subtract-
ing larger and larger fractions of expected target value as



























where (a) Y ′tk is 1 if the number of missiles targeted at t is
greater than or equal to k and is 0 otherwise, and (b) ftk,
0 ftk < 1 for all t and k, is an increasing function of k;
this takes into account some approximation of the prob-
ability that each attacking missile is thwarted. The inner
subproblem remains totally unimodular because we simply
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Thus, the inner subproblem remains a linear program with
a dual formulation, and a mixed-integer linear program for-
mulation for the overall problem can be created.
If it becomes imperative to model point targets with an
objective akin to (A0′), the linear objective of (A0) can
be maintained by letting Ya represent a multiweapon strike
and adjusting ka accordingly. Unfortunately, the constraints
necessary to enforce this would result in a subproblem that
is not totally unimodular. Brown et al. (2004) (see also the
discussion on trilevel defense models in Israeli and Wood
2002) deal successfully with this issue by solving their
analog of JD-MINMAX with a specialized decomposition
algorithm. That technology also applies to our problem, at
least in theory.
Appendix B. Stackelberg Games
The models in JOINT DEFENDER’s basic model com-
prises an instance of a Stackelberg game (von Stackelberg
1952; see Luo et al. 1996, pp. 11–15 for an overview),
which we represent as a bilevel integer linear program
(e.g., Moore and Bard 1990). The bilevel program converts
to a standard MILP for solution purposes.
The key ingredients of any Stackelberg game are a leader
(our defender) and a follower (our attacker). The basic
(“one-play”) version of the game we use has two phases:
(a) The leader carries out a set of actions to coerce behav-
ior from the follower, and (b) the follower observes the
leader’s actions and how they have affected his ability to
respond and/or the value of responding, and reacts by opti-
mizing his own objective. The leader has an objective, too,
which is based on the costs of his own actions and his
evaluation of the follower’s responses. Because the leader
understands and models the follower’s optimizing behavior
precisely, he can and does optimize his own objective by
coercing the follower appropriately. If the follower subop-
timizes for some reason, or if the leader has assumed that
the follower has more flexibility or ability than he actually
does, the leader can guarantee the actual outcome will be
no worse than one predicted by the game.
The leader’s and follower’s objectives in a Stackelberg
game need not be diametrically opposed, but are in our
TBMD problem. Our attacker (follower) wishes to max-
imize total expected damage while our defender (leader)
wishes to minimize that maximum. Our defender’s actions
are constrained by the physical limits on deploying TBMD
platforms and on the physical limits of his interceptors. Our
attacker’s actions of firing TBMs are not constrained by
our defender’s actions, but the values associated with firing
TBMs are. Our defender’s actions affect the success proba-
bilities for our attacker’s missiles and thereby the objective
of total expected damage.
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